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I 6 8 ] Rationality and Theistic Belief 
I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en­
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality 
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to 
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider sqme of 
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those sugges­
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's 
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a 
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation 
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to 
suggest and defend a new parity thesis. 
[ 9 ] 
Planting a on Warrant 
In Chapters 6 and 7 I argued that PTp) and hence PT PI founder on 
the need for background beliefs in the generation and justification 
of theistic beliefs. The problem for Plantinga is generated by the 
kinds of examples he gives, examples in which the theistic believer 
and nonbeliever share the same experience but the former gener­
ates a belief about God whereas the latter does not. My discussion 
to this point has worked only with Plantinga's essays published 
before 1986. His research emphasis changes beginning with his es­
say "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in 
God, " in which he for the first time considers at some length the 
notion of warrant or positive epistemic status as opposed to epi­
stemic justification. Although in that essay he is still directly con­
cerned about the evidentialist challenge and the proper basicality of 
theistic beliefs, later essays and two books deal less directly with 
those concerns but tackle the issue of positive epistemic status or 
warrant-that thing or quantity enough of which separates mere 
true belief from knowledge. What is his account of warrant, and 
can it help his case for epistemic parity between paradigm and 
theistic beliefs?1 
In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first explain 
Plantinga's account of warrant and suggest a new parity thesis on 
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the basis of his account. The new thesis is weighed and found 
wanting for reasons similar to those we have been considering all 
along. 
r. Plantinga' s Account of Warrant 
Plantinga shifts to the language of warrant and posttlve epts­
temic status from the language of justification. He writes: 
What is this quantity enough of which . . . epistemizes true belief? 
. . .  Whatever exactly this further element or quantity may be, it is 
either epistemic justification or something intimately connected 
with it. So perhaps the natural procedure would be just to baptize 
this element, what ever it is, "epistemic justification." But this 
would be misleading. The term "justification" suggests duty, obli­
gation, permission, and rights-the whole deontological stable . 
Furthermore, one of the main contending theories or pictures here 
. . .  explicitly identifies the quantity in question with aptness for epis­
temic duty folfillment; to use the term "justification," then, as a name 
for the quantity in question would be to give this theory a confusing 
and unwarranted (if merely verbal) initial edge over its rivals. I shall 
therefore borrow Chisholm's more neutral term "positive epistemic 
status" as my official name for the quantity in question. 2 
Elsewhere he uses the term "warrant" for this same item. 3 
What is positive epistemic status? Plantinga says, following Chis­
holm, that it is a term of epistemic appraisal. Furthermore, it 
comes in degrees. Finally, it is related to knowledge. Thus, "posi­
tive epistemic status . . .  initially and to a first approximation, is a 
normative property that comes in degrees, enough of which is 
what epistemizes true belief. "4 
In various places Plantinga examines and finds wanting other ac­
counts of warrant. He rejects Chisholmian internalism, non-Chis-
2. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, "  pp. 2-3 .  
3.  See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection t o  Belief in 
God," p. 1 19, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. These 
last two works give the fullest account of Plantinga's thinking on warrant. Unfor­
tunately, at the time the present book went to press, Plantinga's books were not 
yet published. Unless otherwise noted, where I quote in this chapter from these 
works, the page numbers are those of Plantinga's final manuscripts. 
4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, "  p. J. 
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holmian internalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. I do not recount 
the details of his criticisms, but his basic point in many, if not all, 
cases is that the accounts "come to grief when we reflect on the 
variety of ways in which our noetic faculties can fail to function 
properly. "  In each case, the reason for the failure of the accounts 
"is cognitive malfonction, failure of the relevant cognitive faculties to 
function properly. "5 This observation results in a positive charac­
terization of positive epistemic status. Following Plantinga's lead, 
let us consider this account one aspect at a time. 
One necessary condition of positive epistemic status is that one's 
"cognitive equipment, one's belief forming and belief sustaining 
apparatus, be free of . . .  cognitive malfunction. A belief has posi­
tive epistemic status for me only if my cognitive apparatus is func­
tioning properly, working the way it ought to work in producing 
and sustaining it. "6 Planting a notes that proper functioning is not 
to be identified with normal functioning. One's cognitive equip­
ment might be functioning normally (in the statistical sense) when 
one forms the wishful belief that one is about to win the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Under such conditions, one's equipment is not func­
tioning properly; it is not functioning the way it ought to, but it is 
functioning normally. 
Furthermore, consider a case in which your cognitive equipment 
is functioning well in the environment for which it was meant but 
you are moved to an environment in which your equipment was 
not meant to function-Alpha Centauri, for example. Suppose 
there are subtle epistemic differences in the two worlds. Cats are 
invisible in Alpha Centauri, but whenever one is present to a hu­
man he or she forms the belief that a dog is barking. Suppose there 
is a cat present, and hence you hear a dog barking. Even if there is 
a dog barking (in a soundproof room) and thus one's belief that 
there is a dog barking is true, the belief has little by way of positive 
epistemic status. One's equipment may be functioning properly for 
its home environment, but it does not match the environment in 
5. Quotation from Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Func­
tion , "  p. 3 2. On these issues, see also Plantinga, "Chisholmian Intemalism, "  in 
Philosophical Analysis: A Defence by Example, ed. David Austin (Boston: D. Reidel, 
1 987), "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God, " "Justifica­
tion and Theism, " Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. 
6. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, "  p. 32. 
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which it is operating. "So we must add another component to pos­
itive epistemic status; your faculties must be in good working or­
der, and the environment must be appropriate for your particular 
repertoire of epistemic powers. "7 
The final aspect to warrant is the addition of a "firmness of be­
lief' rider. Plantinga says that it is tempting simply to identify a 
beliefs having positive epistemic status with its being produced by 
properly functioning equipment in the appropriate environment. 
This identification would be mistaken, however. Two beliefs could 
be thus formed and yet one have much more warrant than the 
other. Belief in the corresponding conditional of modus ponens has 
more warrant than a vague memory belief even though both are 
formed by properly functioning equipment in the correct environ­
ment. What is needed here is recognition that when one's epistemic 
equipment is working well one's beliefs are held with the appropri­
ate level of firmness: 
Obviously another element of positive epistemic status is the degree 
to which I do or am inclined to accept the belief in question; I can't 
be said to know p, for example, unless I believe it very firmly in­
deed. If my faculties are working properly, the more strongly I be­
lieve . . . p the more positive epistemic status p has for me. When 
our cognitive establishment is working properly, the strength of the 
impulse towards believing a given proposition . . . will be propor­
tional to the degree it has of positive epistemic status-or if the 
relationship isn't one of straightforward proportionality, the appro­
priate functional relationship will hold between positive epistemic 
status and this impulse. 8 
So, at this stage Plantinga's account of warrant is this: "In the 
paradigm cases of warrant, belief B has warrant for S if and only if 
that belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working 
properly in an appropriate environment, and if both B and B* 
have warrant for S, B has more warrant than B* for S if S believes 
B more firmly than B*. "9 This account, he says, needs further re­
finements, some of which he attempts. I do not, for the most part, 
consider these in detail, but only list several of his concerns. First, 
7· Ibid.,  p. 33-
8. Ibid.,  p. 34· 
9. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 8 .  
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he notes that not all my cogmttve faculties need to be working 
properly for a belief to have warrant for me. One's memory may 
play one tricks, but that is not a reason to reject introspective be­
liefs. Second, proper functioning also comes in degrees. A faculty 
does not have to be functioning perfectly in order to produce war­
ranted beliefs. Third, that one's environment is misleading need 
not deprive one's belief of warrant. "What counts . . .  are uncor­
rected and uncompensated malfunctionings. "10 
A more central issue is what Plantinga calls the "design plan. " 
Comparing human beings by analogy to an automobile, he sug­
gests that, just as there are specifications for an engine's operation, 
so there are specifications for the way a human being operates. He 
writes that there is 
something like a set of specifications for a well-formed, properly 
functioning human being-an extraordinarily complicated and 
highly articulated set of specifications. . . . Suppose we call these 
specifications a "design plan," leaving open the question whether 
human beings and other creatures have in fact been designed. Then 
of course the design plan will include specifications for our cognitive 
faculties (as well as for the rest of our powers and faculties). They 
too can work well or badly; they can misfunction or function prop­
erly. They too work in a certain way when they are functioning 
properly-and work in a certain way to accomplish their purpose. 11 
Our design plan is such that our faculties are "highly responsive 
to circumstances. "  Intuition, sight, memory, and so forth do not 
all operate the same way. Experience-both sensuous experience 
and the sort of experience involved in feeling impelled or disposed 
to accept a given belief-is important in the responses of our epi­
stemic faculties. And the design plan orders us such that the pur­
pose of our epistemic faculties is the production of beliefs that are 
true rather than false. There may be aspects of the design plan that 
allow for other ends for faculties. It might be part of the design 
plan that a person with an illness that typically leads to death be­
lieves that she will be the exception to the statistics telling her that 
it is highly likely that she will die. This feature of the design plan 
ro. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 36. 
I I. Ibid. ' pp. 36-37-
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may increase the chances of survival. Nevertheless, she is not war­
ranted in such a belief. Or certain kinds of wishful thinking-that 
one's girlfriend still loves one, for example, when the evidence is 
against it-may reduce one's suffering and hence be a �ood 
thing-part of the design plan-and yet one is not thereby war­
ranted in that belief. And so Plantinga wants to concentrate on that 
segment of the design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs. 
He also argues that his picture of warrant can help us deal with 
Gettier problems: 
We might generalize the idea of a design plan: there is a design plan 
not only for our cognitive faculties, but for the entire cognitive situ­
ation. Take the metaphor in this notion of design more seriously for 
the moment; then the designer of our cognitive powers will have 
designed those powers to produce mostly true beliefs in the sorts of 
situations their owners ordinarily encounter. The designer will be 
aiming at a kind of match between cognitive powers and cognitive 
environment; there will be, we might say, a sort of design plan not 
just for cognitive faculties but for cognitive-faculties-cum-cognitive­
environment. In Gettier situations, however, there are relatively 
minor departures from the design plan for the cognitive situation in 
question; the cognitive environment [or the cognizer's equipment] 
then turns out to be misleading for someone with our cognitive 
powers. And the force of saying that in these cases the beliefs just 
happen to be true, are true by accident . . . [is that] the belie£Is]'s being 
true [are] not a result of things working in accordance with the de­
sign plan. '2 
This account of warrant is, clearly enough, a kind of external­
ism. What are its relationships to internalism? Let me point out 
only a few highlights. In speaking of Alston's account of justifica­
tion-an account that we have seen has both internalist and exter­
nalist components-Plantinga says that, once Alston (rightly) re­
jects the deontological notion of justification, he has to choose 
among many "epistemically valuable but non-deontological states 
of affairs" such as usually believing the truth, now believing the 
truth, having a belief formed by a reliable belief producing mecha­
nism, and so forth. Plantinga suggests that Alston is guided in his 
choice by the received tradition in epistemology which "involves a 
marriage of the idea that deontological justification is central to 
12. Ibid., p. 42. 
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warrant . . . with the notion that . a fundamental intellectual 
duty is that of believing only on the basis of evidence. "  Hence we 
find Alston's emphasis on grounds and on the accessibility of those 
grounds. But Plantinga notes that the received tradition is incoher­
ent: although it claims that deontological justification is sufficient 
for warrant, clearly it is not. One can have done all one's duties, be 
within one's epistemic rights, and so forth, and yet have little if 
any warrant for one's beliefs. Also, there is supposed to be a con­
nection between evidence and warrant. But the deontologically 
justified belief need not rest on evidence. Plantinga's point is that, 
insofar as Alston's understanding of justification is constrained by 
the received tradition (even though Alston explicitly rejects a 
straightforwardly deontological account of justification) , it foun­
ders on the fact that all we need for counterexamples to it are 
"cases where some phenomenon is in fact a reliable indicator of the 
truth of a proposition, but my believing the proposition in ques­
tion on the basis of that phenomenon arises from cognitive mal­
function. " So even though Alston moves away from deontological 
notions of justification, he does not completely escape their influ­
ence, at least according to Plantinga. 13 
So, says Plantinga, epistemic duty fulfillment is not nearly suffi­
cient for warrant. Since the internalist tradition is, by and large, 
deontologically understood, an internalist aspect to justification is 
not sufficient either. But is it necessary? In particular, is epistemic 
duty fulfillment necessary? Plantinga's answer is an initial no. But 
his answer here is not firm. 14 First he notes that one can conclude 
that in general the doing of one's intellectual duty is neither neces­
sary nor sufficient for warrant. But then he goes on to wonder 
whether it sometimes is important. He specifically wonders how to 
state a question about this issue, for if duty fulfillment is not neces­
sary, how can it be important, ever? He concludes by stating: 
The deontological internalist ordinarily exaggerates our degree of 
control over our own beliefs; and she is certainly mistaken in think­
ing that epistemically dutiful behavior is sufficient for warrant. It 
13.  Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, pp. 246, 248, 252. 
14. In, perhaps, more ways than one. What I say and quote in this paragraph is 
not derived from the version of the manuscript Plantinga sent to the publisher. 
The discussion does not, to my knowledge, appear in those final versions. I there­
fore do not wish to put too much weight on this point. 
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also seems that dutifulness isn't necessary for high degrees of war­
rant (although here there is more room for doubt). Still, there are 
indeed circumstances when a failure to be dutiful is all that stands 
between me and high warrant. And now the main point: when 
things are going properly, when I am behaving in accord with the 
design plan for human beings, I will not be violating my epistemic 
duty. Perhaps it is my duty not to take drugs that will prevent me 
from forming true beliefs or cause me to form wildly false ones; our 
design plan, you might say, presupposes that I �on't do that; it 
makes no provision for my doing that, and if I do that my faculties 
will not produce the results they are supposed to. No doubt it is 
part of my epistemic duty not to try to alter my noetic inclinations 
and tendencies just for the fun of it, to try to become extremely 
skeptical, for example, so that I come to believe next to nothing­
or, on the other hand, to become unduly gullible . . .. Our design 
plan includes our doing our epistemic duty, at least for the most 
part." 
So there is some kind of "epistemic duty fulfillment intemalism" in­
volved in warrant, but the relationship is not a clear one-except that 
this intemalist aspect is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. 
In another place Plantinga allows for an intemalist aspect to war­
rant-conferring circumstances that is not obviously related to de­
ontological considerations. Plantinga notes Alston's rejection of the 
demand that one must know or justifiably believe the epistemic 
principles on which one's beliefs rest. He grants that one may be­
lieve that 2 + 1 = 3 on the basis of its just seeming utterly obvious 
to one. Neither justification nor warrant requires that one have any 
views as to whether its seeming that way to one is a reliable indica­
tion of its actually being that way. But this is not true in all cases, 
says Plantinga. One may believe that a bear has passed by on the 
basis of the way the brush looks; and to have warrant for this be­
lief, one must know or warrantedly believe that the brush's having 
that particular crushed sort of look is indeed a reliable indicator 
that a bear has been by. In summary Plantinga writes: 
So there isn't anything at all like a simple, single answer to the ques­
tion whether warrant for grounded beliefs requires that the subject 
know that the ground is [a reliable] indicator of the belief; some­
times this is required and sometimes it is not. And the reason is not 
15. Quoted from an early draft of Plantinga's work on warrant, the chapter on 
externalism, p. 22. 
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far to seek. In some cases it is perfectly in accord with proper cogni­
tive function to believe A on the basis of B even if you have never 
had any views at all as to whether B is an indictor of A; in a wide 
variety of other cases a properly functioning human being will be­
lieve A on the basis of B only if she has first learned that B reliably 
indicates A; in certain cases where you are aware of partial malfunc­
tion, to have warrant you will have to believe of a ground that it is a 
reliable indicator, even though in the absence of such malfunction 
you would not have had to have any views at all on the subject. Of 
course there will be many other complications. And the point is that 
it is the complex, highly articulated nature of the human design plan 
that makes impossible simple generalizations of these sorts about 
rationality and warrant. 16 
One presumes that such an occasional requirement does not lead to 
an infinite regress of the type that motivates Alston to deny the 
requirement that one be justified in believing the justificatory prin­
ciples that ground one's beliefs. 
The central point in all this is just that the basic idea of Plan­
tinga's account of warrant is extemalist even though intemalist fea­
tures sometimes come into play. These cannot be specified ahead 
of time, for they are dependent on details of the epistemic situa­
tions. In sum, then, Plantinga says, there is a presupposition in 
thinking about warrant in the way he suggests. This presupposi­
tion is that 
when our faculties function in accord with the design plan (in an 
appropriate environment) the beliefs they produce are for the most 
part true . . . .  Further, we take it for granted that these faculties are 
reliable; they not only do produce true beliefs, but would produce true 
beliefs even if things were moderately different .. . .  our presupposi­
tion is that in general (for a person S with properly functioning 
faculties in an appropriate environment, and given the above quali­
fications [not all of which have been discussed in this chapter]) the 
more firmly S believes p, the more likely it is that p is true. 17 
2. Warrant, Knowledge, and the Parity Thesis 
Recognizing that Plantinga's concerns just explained are not 
those of his earlier essays in which he directly argues for an epi-
16. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 56. 
17. Ibid., p. 19. 
[ I 7 7  
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stemic parity between paradigm and theistic beliefs, it is neverthe­
less worth while to ask how his account of warrant might apply to 
the issue of parity. Can it help PT p1? The first thing to note is the 
obvious role Plantinga's theism has played in the development of 
his account of warrant. This role is explicitly discussed in "Justi­
fication and Theism. " To keep the point short, since Plantinga is a 
theist, it is natural for him to think of humans, made in the image 
of God, as cognitive creatures capable of knowing. Hence God is 
the designer, and the notion of a design plan is a natural outflow­
ing of this view of the world. But Plantinga does not suggest that 
one has to be a theist in order to accept his account, or that his 
account obviously entails theism. It may, but he does not press the 
point. 
Nevertheless, given that God is the maker of the design plan, 
and that he is loving, kind, and interested in us knowing him, it is 
natural to think that God would have included in the human de­
sign plan a way we could come to know God. Plantinga's occa­
sional reference to Calvin's sensus Divinitas illustrates this. What is 
the relationship between these suggestions and the claim that be­
liefs about God can be properly basic? Plantinga himself asks this 
question and urges other theistic philosophers to consider it too. 18 
Clearly, a beliefs being properly basic is not the same thing as its 
being warranted; a beliefs being properly basic is not sufficient for 
warrant. Since proper basicality, as I have been using the term, is a 
kind of justification, and warrant and justification are not the same 
thing, then warrant and proper basicality are not the same thing. 19 
But is a beliefs being warranted (in a noninferential manner) 
sufficient for its being properly basic? This is not clearly the case; 
even though one is generally doing one's epistemic duty when 
one's epistemic equipment is functioning properly, Plantinga indi­
cates that the connection is not a necessary one. So being properly 
basic, that is, being noninferentially normatively justified (being 
within one's rights in holding a belief without discursive evidence) 
is not straightforwardly analyzable in terms of proper function. 
Nevertheless, Plantinga's earlier work certainly relies on the sup­
position that there is one piece of our belief-forming equipment 
r 8. Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," p. 425. 
19. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga does make use of the notion of 
basicality in ways not necessarily connected to justification. See Chapters 3 and 5, 
for example. 
Plantinga on Warrant [ I 79 
that generates theistic beliefs. So perhaps to the extent that he 
would say that the generation of theistic beliefs is due to the proper 
functioning of our equipment it is fair to suggest that PT PI receives 
some support from his latest analysis. Just as our equipment func­
tions properly to generate and warrant paradigm beliefs, so it oper­
ates to generate and warrant theistic beliefs. To the extent that a 
beliefs having warrant for us makes that belief justified for us, it is 
true to say that Plantinga's analysis of warrant supports PT PI· 
More direct yet is this suggestion. Although epistemic justifica­
tion (and its internalism, deontologism, proper basicality, etc.) is 
an interesting and important notion, it does not provide us with an 
analysis of the feature that turns mere true belief into knowledge. 
Since we are interested in the strongest account of epistemic parity, 
what more could we ask than to say that propositions about physi­
cal objects, other minds, and the past, on the one hand, and God 
and his actions, on the other, can all be known? So, just as Mary 
can know that there is a tree in front of her, she can know that 
God exists, or perhaps that he wants her to concentrate on philo­
sophical theology rather than the ontology of art. Such a parity 
thesis would certainly be interesting. And I believe Plantinga's 
work might allow him to make such a claim. But let us set knowl­
edge aside for the moment and simply ask about a parity thesis 
making reference to warrant. 
Plantinga might suggest that both paradigm beliefs and theistic 
beliefs have warrant, but since there are levels of warrant, to make 
it a parity thesis he might propose the following: 
Plantinga's Parity Thesis* (PTti) :  For person S, whose 
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro­
priate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs 
have the same level of epistemic warrant. 
A more narrowly construed parity thesis is 
Plantinga's Parity Thesis*' (PT;;) :  For a person S, whose 
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro­
priate environment, physical object beliefs and theistic be­
liefs have the same level of epistemic warrant. 
If that level of warrant is strong enough for knowledge, and if one 
believes a true theistic proposition, then one can know the theistic 
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proposition, just as one can know the paradigm propositions, or, 
more particularly, 
J
hysical object propositions. 
Are PTt\ or PT PI true? I suggest not, for something like the rea­
sons we have considered all along. Let us suppose that, for the 
kinds of reasons discussed throughout this essay, even where one's 
equipment is functioning properly, the part that generates and 
warrants theistic belief must rely on background beliefs. Where it 
is justification, as opposed to warrant, that is at stake, the back­
ground beliefs themselves need justification. At least so I have ar­
gued. With warrant, however, this is not true. One's epistemic 
equipment may need background beliefs for the generation of cer­
tain kinds of beliefs, but warrant may derive simply from the 
proper function of the equipment in the appropriate environment 
(and so forth) . The background beliefs appealed to may not them­
selves need to be warranted. Nevertheless, the reliance of our 
equipment on background beliefs worries us epistemically, even if 
no warrant is explicitly required for them. The basic reason for this 
is complexity. There is more room for slip-ups or mistakes. Epi­
stemic practices involving background beliefs may function as well 
as those that do not, but the simple fact of their greater complexity 
warns us away from trusting them as much, even if they are func­
tioning properly in their environment. Put another way, even if 
functioning properly, two practices may function differently and 
one may not function as well as the other. Memory, for example, 
may not be as reliable in producing true beliefs as perception. So, 
noninferential mediated practices may not be as reliable as concep­
tual-reading practices. This is true whether Plantinga understands 
the role of experience to be of the direct Alstonian type or the 
exaggerated Alstonian type considered in earlier chapters. In the 
case of PT�, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs are always 
separate, epistemically, since the practice delivering one is a nonin­
ferential mediated practice and the practice delivering the other is a 
conceptual-reading practice. The appeal to background beliefs in 
identifying an experience as one of an epistemically unique individ­
ual simply puts epistemic practices that make such an appeal on a 
different epistemic level. This does not entail that one does not 
have warrant for theistic beliefs, or that one can not know them. It 
only says that there is some reason to think that the level of war­
rant is not the same. Furthermore, this does not mean that belief-
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forming practices that are noninferential mediated practices are not 
practices capable of generating warranted beliefs. It may be part of 
the design plan that some practices are noninferential mediated 
practices, just as some practices, or at least some application of 
practices, need access to beliefs about the reliability of the practice, 
as Plantinga suggests. 
What about memory beliefs and beliefs about other persons? The 
issue is less clear, at least to me, in the case of memory. It seems 
that memory is a conceptual-reading practice, or at least not a 
practice in which one uses background beliefs. Suppose one's 
memories are attended by the sensuous experience to which Plan­
tinga refers in several places. Surely one simply forms the memory 
belief in the conceptual-reading manner noted above. At least it 
seems obvious that one generally does not bring in background 
beliefs. If, on the other hand, one's memories are not attended by 
the sensuous experience, as some apparently are not, then it seems 
quite clear that no background beliefs are needed for the formation 
of memory beliefs; they are simply present to one's consciousness. 
The practice or subpractice of generating beliefs about other per­
sons needs further analysis, which I defer until the next chapter. 
Let me just say that, as with PP versus unique physical object prac­
tice, and religious practice versus CP, there seems to be a distinc­
tion between the practice of forming beliefs that categorize what is 
experienced into kinds of things (persons) and the practice of form­
ing beliefs about epistemically unique persons. Insofar as Plan­
tinga's concern is the former, then PTt\ (as well as PT Ph for that 
matter) is not true with respect to other-mind paradigm be­
liefs. 
Back to the main point. There is some reason to think PTt\ is 
not true, most obviously in the case of the parallel between the 
formation and warranting of theistic beliefs and physical object be­
liefs. But even though I suggest that there are different levels of 
warrant for theistic beliefs as opposed to physical object beliefs, 
this does not show that one could not know theistic propositions. 
There is, as Plantinga notes, a minimal level of warrant needed for 
knowledge. But nothing says that a proposition could not have 
more warrant for me than is needed for knowledge (and thus one 
could perhaps know one thing more strongly than another) . So 
even though, as it seems to me, PTt\ is not true, a parity thesis 
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according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis­
tic beliefs might be made out. 
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis 
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is 
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser­
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not 
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge. 
( IO ] 
Confirmation and Theism 
My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the 
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In 
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on 
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I 
used a similar challenge to refute PT AS· The challenge to Plan­
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser 
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con­
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to 
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus­
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This 
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity 
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA 
and PT PI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre­
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3 
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed 
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi­
fication of theistic belief. 
I .  The Predictive Confirmation Challenge 
The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard 
Grigg, who writes: 
